1.
Aquinas on naming the divine "And I shall give them in my house and within my walls a place and a name better than sons and daughters; I shall give them an everlasting name that will never be effaced", says the Lord (Isa 56.5). This prophecy occasions Thomas Aquinas to briefly outline a possible sermon (collatio it is called by some 3 ) on the names of the faithful and the Name itself.
Aquinas' notes are divided on two subjects: the names of the faithful, and and hold firmly to my name" (cf. Rev 2,13), and is a token of the renewal of the mind: to those "I will give a white stone, with a new name written on it" (Rev 2,17). The shorthand that Aquinas here employs, leaves ample space for interpretation. Names constitute one's identity, an identity in this case dominated by primordial calling that corresponds to eschatological destination, revolving around adoption and grace. Such is the identity of the faithful, which ranges from 'beginning' to 'end', and lives from Christ's work of salvation. Their spiritual life of being called upon, expresses itself in love for the Name; the Name that includes Christ the Saviour: the Name is great and arouses fear, as the Lord says that "My Name is great among the nations" (Mal 1,11). The Name is holy and incites veneration: "He has done great things for me, holy is his name" (Lk 1,49). The Name is delightful and calls for meditation: "Thy Name and thy memory is what my soul longs for" (Isa 26,13, Nomen tuum et memoriale tuum in desiderio animae). The Name is abundant in compassion: "Thy Name is an oil poured out" (Sg 1,2, Oleum effusum nomen tuum). The Name is powerful to invoke: "the Father will give you anything you ask him in my name" (Jn 15, 16). The Name is uniquely capable of salvation: "There is no other name under heaven in which we can be saved" (Acts 4,12). Lastly the Name is hidden for knowledge:
"What is his Name, and what is the name of his Son, do you know?" (Pr 30,4).
These seven aspects of the Name are telling. First of all because the Name includes Jesus Christ. Aquinas makes no distinction here between names of God and names of Christ. On the contrary, he comes close to saying that 'Jesus' is the name of God, quoting from Peter's homily in Acts. The fact that the aspects are seven will not be coincidental: the names of God and Christ are innumerous, and the reason for this is intimated by the last one mentioned: the hiddenness of the name of God and the name of the Son. Most divine names, Scriptural as they are, are taken from creaturely perfections, all of which preexist in God in an eminent way; no creaturely representation, be it real or be it mental in those who attempt to understand, will be adequate. For this, Scripture takes its refuge to a plurality, a multitude of names, of translations of the Name.
These few words, written by a still youthful Thomas Aquinas, probably in Cologne, may come as a surprise to some, who are not accustomed to the more spiritual aspect of Aquinas' work. In fact, I
would like to defend, and have done so elsewhere 4 , that the theological attitude that this little scheme betrays, is fundamental for Aquinas.
Aquinas' theological authorship is characterized by a profound interest in language and naming the divine; the naming of Christ is an essential part of this interest, which is animated by Aquinas Henry's concern is with his students, and in line of this with the public character of theology, of speech about God. The exteriority of spoken words about God is not to be reduced to the interiority of prayer, even though the former bespeaks the latter, but has a value of its own. propositions, and the third "nomina quibus utimur loquentes de deo ratione nature assumpte" (f. 13r) 13 propositions. The rules that Henry mentions are most interesting. Some of them will be examined later on, but in general one has to concede that their formulation stems from a practice of teaching in which a certain kind of theology has become dominant and is translated for the needs of students: the theology of Thomas Aquinas. To this we will return shortly.
The same spirit that animated the general prologue is to be recognized in the prologues to the second and third part of the treatise.
The prologue to the second part once again quotes from Isa 26, but now a distinction is made which is famous for the controversy it bred: the distinction between natural knowledge of God, and inspired knowledge. From the contents of these prologues it may confidently be concluded that the christological part of this treatise on naming the divine constitutes its climax. In this respect Henry shows himself to be a faithful student of Aquinas, whom he never bothers to mention, but silently quotes. According to Henry there is an evident linkage between Aquinas'
treatise on divine names, on the divine persons and on God the saviour, since all of them revolve around language in divinis: its inadequacy, its truth, its rules and its spirituality.
Henry's interpretation of Summa Theologiae I, q. 13
It takes some effort to discover the principles for Henry's organisation of the material of I, 13, Aquinas' major treatment of naming the divine in general. At first sight it looks like he has thrown it all in the air and has represented it in the way it had come down. But appeareances deceive.
Henry's didactic purpose has appreciated the students' predilection for concrete names. Therefore he starts out, in the first three propositions (2, 3, and 4) with three, in fact five, different kinds of names: a) stone, rock, lion, lamb, grapevine, and the like b) lord, creator, cause, saviour, and the like (knowledge, foreknowledge, predestination, providence and the like) c) to be, to live, to know, to understand; to be good, wise, just, true, free; to be active, to be immaterial, and the like (to be eternal, to be independent, to be omnipotent, to be pure act, to be first cause, and the like)
The first are identified as metaphors and temporal names which are predicated improperly of God, the second signify relations ex tempore (or ab aeterno) but are said truly and properly, whereas the third and most important type of names are considered to be the divine attributes, which Anselm called predicata perfectionalia (different from names said cum excessu perfectionis, as to be eternal etc.).
The next three propositions (5, 6, 7) consider different aspects from what Henry calls the divine attributes: they signify God substantially but imperfectly and analogously, they are not synonyms even though they stand for God's simplicity, and their multiplicity is not only due to the naming subject but has a ground in the one named even though the one named is one. 13 The following propositions (8, 9) are once again devoted to particular names: or homo est homo (identical predication), in all cases a real identity is affirmed between that which is denoted by the subject-term, and connoted by the predicate-term. The fact that the proposition is composed of several terms is due to our mode of understanding and signification, but does not eo ipso imply a real composition in the subject about which the proposition is formed. Therefore no violation of God's simplicity is committed. In the course of his determination Aquinas employs the rule that predicate-terms are to be interpreted formally, and subject-terms materially. This is the same distinction between signification and supposition formulated in different words: predicates signify or connote the form, whereas subject-terms supposit or stand for In the course of his treatment of christological language, Henry unfolds thirteen propositions, in all respects according to the order of the Tertia Pars. 18 The first proposition could be translated as: "A sound foreknowledge of the mode of union of the Word Incarnate is the most favourable proem for rightly speaking about the divine incarnation". 19 Nothing could better hit the heart of the matter. The twofold stress on the fact that knowledge of the mode of the union precedes the rest is telling.
Henry considers questions 2-15 as presuppositions for christological language. For that is the part which Aquinas subsumes under "de modo unionis Verbi Incarnati" (III 2 pr.). Questions 16-26 are "de his quae consequuntur unionem" (III 16 pr.), and one expects Henry to count these as belonging to the "favourable proem" as well. As a result one has to notice that all propositions Henry formulates belong to this area. 20 Consequently, everything that follows has to be regarded as a prolegomenon, a proem to actual christological language. This is quite important to note, since otherwise one might be tempted to discard this kind of reflection on account of its lack of historical or soteriological interest: it does not intend to do that job nor suggest that it should not be done at all, it just considers it fruitful to formulate a proem so that the conditions of possibility of "loquendi recte de divina incarnatione" will be fulfilled. How important that is for Henry is the subject of the first lines, where he says that from such knowledge all ability depends to discern between language fitting or unfitting for the mystery of the incarnation. 21 One should note the use of sermones convenientes et disconvenientes. Henry ends his treatment, saying that a smart reader will be able, on the basis of this material, to judge which christological language to prefer. 22 At the end of the third prologue he talked about propositions "containing the art of enunciating faithfully the language (sermo) emerging because of the incarnation". 23 Well now, the expression sermones must be taken literally.
Henry is engaged in explaining and interpreting the very wording of fundamental sound propositions concerning Christ. 24 In the first proposition it is explained how the mode of the union should be understood, and the other propositions indicate what kind of words and propositions fit that mode. Would the mode be otherwise, other locutions would be needed. 25 'Union' and 'assumption', and their different forms, are key words in christology, but they possess a highly different semantics. What can be said with the one, cannot be said with the other and vice versa. For instance, the one who unites can be said to be the one united, whereas the one who assumes cannot be said to be the one assumed; it can truly be said that human nature is united to divine nature or that divine nature is united to human nature, but to say that "O Iesu salvator seculi multa nobis nomina attulit sancta tua incarnatio et philosophiam omni admiratione dignam et priscis seculis philosophorum inauditam, quorum studio hec tercia pars presentis opusculi insistens proferet propositiones artem continentes fideliter enunciandi sermonem vigore incarnationis emergentem eo ductore previo cui dicendum est sincera devotione: "Domine nomen tuum et memoriale tuum in desiderio anime mee", f. 13v. 13.
Weiler (o.c. p. 144) considers this to be a silent critique of the position of Duns Scotus and his distinctio formalis. It evidently is a personal addition to the contents of q. 13 by Henry himself. 14.
Cf The order is as follows: the hypostatic union (1-3), the grace and knowledge of Christ (4-5), the communicatio idiomatum in speaking about Christ (6), the being of Christ (7), the will and operations (8), prayer and priesthood (9), predestination and adoration (10), mediator and son of his virgin mother (11), nativities (12), and sorrow and joy on the cross (13). One easily recognizes the original order of treatment in ST III. infirmus, superdives est egenus, immensum est in virginis utero clausum, Virgo peperit, Deus esurit etc.", f. 16v. The rule that he formulates, silently quoted from ST III, 16, 4, seems incomprehensible without the latter's context. Aquinas stresses that it is forbidden to reserve the human predicates for Christus homo and the divine predicates for Christus Deus, even though one has to distinguish between the different meanings of the predicates. All predicates are truthfully said of Christus homo as well as of Christus Deus: "Regula tamen est notanda qua dicitur quod "in propositione in qua aliquid de aliquo predicatur, non solum attenditur quid sit illud" quod predicatur et "de quo predicatur, sed etiam secundum quid". Unde de eodum supposito et subiecto predicantur in concreto ea quae sunt nature divine, et ea quae sunt nature assumpte. Sed tamen dicuntur [distinguuntur -HS] ea secundum quam predicantur predicata", f. 16v. 32.
"Quia vero regula est, quod unius rei est tantum unum esse simpliciter. Hinc est quod impossibile est multiplicari illud esse quod pertinet ad ipsam personam aut hypostasim secundum se. Et quia in Christo est tantum una hypostasis cui natura humana coniungitur hypostatice et non accidentaliter, hinc est quod Christo secundum humanam naturam non advenit novum esse personale, sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis preexistentis ad naturam humanam, ut scilicet illa persona iam dicatur subsistere, non solum secundum naturam divinam, sed etiam humanam. Sicut si post constitutionem persone fortis advenirent forti pedes, manus vel oculi, non adveniret forti aliud esse sed solum quaedam relatio ad huiusmodi", f. 17r.
